

Using Ethnicity to Target the Personal Vote

Assessing the Impact of Electoral Systems on Personal Appeals of Legislators

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Abstract

Minority legislators in developed democracies may or may not emphasize their ethnicity as a key component of their ability to represent their constituents. Previous research has analyzed the behavior of representatives when voters focus on legislator personality over party affiliation (the personal vote). However, do electoral systems that emphasize the personal vote also influence legislators' propensity to emphasize their own ethnicity to voters? Using Facebook posts, this work creates an original dataset to examine minority legislators in four cases (Germany, the United Kingdom, Austria and the United States) in which the strength of the personal vote varies significantly. Confirming the differences across institutions in these nations, this work finds that minority legislators in the United States emphasize their ethnic identity in appeals to their constituents much more often, compared to the other nations. Additionally, there appears to be an ideological divide between these appeals, with left leaning constituents emphasizing their ethnicity more often.

Introduction

Legislators generally attempt to appeal to the broadest segment of the electorate, in an attempt to maximize their vote share. However, in some institutional settings, such as single-member districts, the nature of the electoral institutions alter incentive structures making it conducive to pursuing more specific segments of the voting population. The personal vote, first defined by Shugart and Carey (1992), is simply a legislator's effort to play-up their background, activities, qualifications, etc. to appeal to voters. Though many have endeavored to examine this type of vote, the measurements for this concept can be somewhat ambiguous. The following work provides a new way to measure this concept, with a specific focus on the use of the personal vote among ethnic legislators. The purpose is to determine the degree to

which institutions alter the incentives for representatives to emphasize or ignore their minority status in their appeals to voters.

This work creates an original dataset of ethnic legislators from the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Austria to test for the usage of the personal vote using social media. First, the current literature on the subject will be reviewed to illustrate the importance of this question as well as the limitations of previous works to this point. This discussion will be followed by the theoretical foundations for both the institutional expectations, as well as the justification for the use of social media data. Following this, the measures, methods, and results will be discussed. To conclude, a brief presentation of the limitations of this study and the possible avenues for further research will be explored.

The Personal Vote

The personal vote is the electoral support for a candidate that stems from their individual “personal qualities, qualifications, activities, and record” (Shugart and Carey, 1992, p. 111). Conceptually, this voter support is exclusively referring to backing candidates gain through their association with a party. It is also considered separate from the demographic characteristics of voters and exogenous influences, such as economic performance or international events. Political environments that favor the personal vote incentivize candidates to focus their energies on connecting constituent support to their personal qualities. The building of personal relationships with voters is thought to minimize the exogenous influence of regular swings in party support on the electoral prospects of individual candidates (Cain et al, 1984). Furthermore, the literature explores the influence of the political environment, which argues that the degree to which individual candidates are incentivized to build personal connections with constituents, depends on whether political power is obtained via individual or party electoral outcomes.

The Political Environment

Personal vote incentives are dependent on the institutional setting. The overarching constitution shapes the opportunities and limitations within particular systems. If the executive is dependent on the parliamentary confidence of an elected assembly, then party cohesion is critical to government longevity, which results in a reduction in the value of individual politician’s reputations. Conversely, under a more independent executive, within a presidential system, party discipline is lower, establishing the importance of individual reputations. Thus the value of the personal votes that stem from these reputations increases under presidential systems (Shugart and Carey, 1992). Furthermore, Shugart et al. (2009) argue that comparisons between electoral systems has established a general consensus that candidates in single-member districts cultivate the personal vote much more heavily than candidates competing in large multi-seat proportional representation districts (Cain et al, 1984; Bowler and Farrell, 1993; Lancaster and Patterson, 1990; Scholl, 1986; Stratman and Baur, 2002). Variation in electoral rules and party strength within these systems has a significant effect on personal vote seeking (Carey and Shugart, 1995). The individual reputation of a candidate is much more influential in open list systems in comparison to closed

lists (Sartori, 1976; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; Ames, 1992). A lack of centralized party control over the ranking and placement of candidates on ballots, individual competition with co-partisans, and a single vote per voter within intra-party voting, all increase the incentive to pursue the personal vote. In turn, these variables interact with district magnitude. If electoral rules and party voting already favor the personal vote, an increase in the district magnitude will make a candidate's personal reputation more important, as they must differentiate themselves from additional competition. However, if existing rules do not foster the personal vote, an increase in magnitude reduces the importance of personal reputation even further (Carey and Shugart, 1995). Finally, Shugart et al (2009) find that in open list systems, as the district magnitude decreases, it becomes more likely that winning candidates were born locally or have more local-level electoral experience. In these environments, which favor the personal vote, candidates with local ties have an advantage by building personal connections to constituents.

Additional work has looked at the expected value of the personal vote in PR systems with either open party lists or single-transferable vote (STV) preference voting systems. In open list systems, such as Brazil, the addition of intra-party competition results in candidates competing both against candidates from competing parties and from within their own (Ames, 1995; Carey and Shugart, 1995; Martin, 2010). Research shows that in STV systems, such as Ireland, voters often vote for candidates from the same party (Gallagher, 2003), and that their preference exhibits increased dependence on the candidate's personal qualities, as opposed to their party label (Marsh, 2007). This dynamic makes candidate differentiation from their fellow party members key, which encourages the pursuit of specific blocs of voters within districts using the personal vote. This has been observed in East Asia (Grofman, 1999; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1993), Latin America (Ames, 1995; Crisp et al, 2004; Crisp and Ingall, 2002) and Ireland (Gallagher, 2003). Additionally, research has found other specific attributes that arise from systems that favor the personal vote, although there are also some limitations.

In electoral systems that favor the personal vote, it is a significant part of the incumbency advantage returning candidates typically enjoy. Ansolabehere et al (2000) determine that the personal vote can account for up to two-thirds of the incumbency advantage. Desposato and Petrocik (2003) find similar results in the 25 to 30 percent range. This advantage becomes more pronounced as the level of partisan support for the opposing party increases in an incumbent's district. Ansolabehere et al. argue that candidates in these competitive districts have a greater incentive to build more personal connections with their constituents, as a few hundred votes could swing the election. However, Desposato and Petrocik argue for a more sophisticated conceptual understanding of the personal vote's electoral benefit. It is not simply a bonus tacked on to existing voter support, but rather an "anchor" that maintains support among

wavering partisan and independent voters. Strong partisans will likely vote the party regardless of the personal characteristics of individual candidates.

The presence of the personal vote can also impact governance. Primo and Snyder (2008) argue that the personal vote makes it difficult to deliver collective benefits, as politicians are incentivized to deliver particularized benefits to only their districts in order to differentiate themselves for the next election. They provide empirical support across US states, finding that state legislators in stronger party environments tend to demand less local particularized benefits (pork) and more collective benefits. This even extends to the national

level, as members of Congress from stronger party environments tend to deliver less federally-funded pork to their home states.

The greater prevalence of pork in electoral systems that value the personal vote show that candidates recognize the value of building personal connections with constituents in these environments. Mayhew's (1974) and Fenno's (1974) works illustrate the importance of candidate homestyle, responsiveness to constituents, and bringing home federal dollars in the personal-vote-driven US context. These findings have been corroborated across a number of electoral systems dominated by the personal vote (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1987; Geddes, 1994; Avelino Filho 1994; Mainwaring, 1999; Samuels, 2002; Martin 2010). This is a natural outgrowth of the electoral incentives that guide candidate behavior. The need to enhance individual popularity pushes politicians to promise "pork and patronage" to the narrow constituencies that will deliver them the next election; however, this often comes at the cost of national policy and public good production (Nielson, 2001, 11). Golden (2001) argues that the infamous bureaucratic inefficiencies, bloated legislation, and corruption within the Italian system stem from a desire by legislators to provide additional means of delivering enhanced constituency service. Voters who were consistently frustrated by the inefficient system look to their local representatives to help them, who in turn assist their constituents through the many hurdles the legislators themselves had built, in order to gain electoral support in thanks. Finally, Samuels' (2002) analysis shows that in the Brazilian context, providing additional pork does not reliably provide additional votes for legislators. Instead, he argues that legislators provide pork to private sector interests who benefit from government contracts in return for the campaign money they require to win the next election.

Clearly there are important restrictions and benefits that the political environment provides to the representative and the community, indicating the importance of understanding the impact of the personal vote. One of the major limitations to current literature on the topic has been how to measure and operationalize this concept. The following work proposes an innovative way to target a segment of the personal vote, the ethnic appeal.

Measuring the Personal Vote

Past work on the personal vote has been dominated by the American context (Ansolabehere et al, 2000; Carey and Shugart, 1995; Desposato and Petrocik, 2003; Primo and Snyder, 2008) to list only a few. The rest of the world has not been covered nearly as comprehensively (Cain et al, 1984; Golden, 2001; Moser and Scheiner, 2005; Martin, 2010; Hallerberg and Marrier, 2001; Strattman and Baur, 2002). Systematic cross-country comparative analysis has primarily centered on the UK/US comparison (Cain et al, 1984) or within region (Hallerberg and Marrier (2001).

These analyses have used a variety of techniques to isolate the impact of the electoral system on the personal vote or the effect of the personal vote on electoral outcomes. Surveys of individual voters have attempted to find the influence of the personal vote on voter decision-making (Cain et al, 1984). Surveys and elite interviews of MPs tease out their perspective on what influences voters and their own behavior (Cain et al, 1984; Martin, 2010). Strattman and Baur (2002) use committee membership as a proxy for constituency service to

measure whether legislators pursue committee membership related to their particular voting bloc. Formal bargaining models lay out the case for the rational behavior of candidates in response to the incentive structure created by the personal vote (Primo and Snyder, 2008). Complex statistical analysis has attempted to bypass surveys and derive the electoral benefit of the personal vote through longitudinal comparison following changes such as redistricting (Ansolabehere et al, 2000) or budgetary adjustments (Hallerberg and Marrier, 2001).

In their own development of their dataset quantitatively measuring the significance of the personal vote across multiple electoral systems, Carey and Shugart (1995) list the many challenges of isolating the personal vote. Proxies are generally the closest researchers can come to quantitatively determine the strength of the personal vote. Public opinion polls measuring name recognition, roll call votes following legislative behavior, or comparing campaign spending between candidates and parties are common. However, these are often unreliable outside of the US and difficult to compare across countries.

Clearly there are important implications to studying the personal vote that impact both the voter and the representative. To this point, the study of this topic has been restricted to using somewhat ambiguous approximations of this concept. The following work endeavors to use the actual appeal of these representatives as a way to gauge the conditions under which the use of the personal vote is increased. Examining the messaging on these minority representative's social media, this work approaches measurement in a more direct manner.

Theory

To advance the literature, this work expands the analysis of the personal vote outside of the US to include several European cases (the UK, Germany and Austria), and incorporate a new method of measuring the personal vote by analyzing US Congress members, MP, and MC social media activity.

Deviating slightly from previous approaches, this work focuses on a particular segment of the personal vote - minority appeals to constituents of the same ethnicity. As Shugart et al (2009) point out, minimal literature has attempted to understand how the personal vote may guide the 'attributes' of legislative candidates, as opposed to their behavior in office. The majority of the literature has focused on how the personal vote encourages legislators to deliver particularized benefits to their constituents. Previous work has looked at the "social backgrounds and occupations" of legislators and their connection to the personal vote (Lowenberg, 1979; Putnam, 1976; Gallagher, 1985; Diaz, 2004), but few analyses has attempted to link the prevalence of these attributes to the electoral system itself using intra-country or cross-national comparisons. Shugart et al. took a first step, finding that across six countries legislators were more likely to have personal connections to their constituency (local birthplace or lower-level electoral experience) in electoral systems that favored the personal vote. This work endeavors to further this research agenda by analyzing when legislators leverage these personal ties to their constituents via individual attributes (in this case ethnicity).

Alongside the standard predictors of voting behavior in the US - party identification, ideology, and policy positions - ethnic attachment and appeals are particularly salient for minority voters (Collingwood et al, 2014; Barreto, 2010; Barreto and Pedraza, 2009; Barreto

and Segura, 2010; Dahl, 1961). The use of shared identity appeals by candidates can improve a candidate's electoral prospects by both improving constituent support and turnout (Nuño, 2007; Barreto and Nuño, 2011; Ramírez, 2005; Michelson, 2003). Based on the personal vote literature, this work expects that the use of such shared identity appeals will be more effective, and thus more prevalent, in electoral systems that favor the personal vote.

Similar to Shugart et al. (2009), it is theorized that the individual attributes of a legislator, such as local origins, local electoral experience, or ethnicity, can provide substantive cues to voters regarding their legislator's understanding of their local needs. This work focuses solely on ethnicity as a local cue voters are likely to rely on. Rather than looking simply for the presence of ethnic minorities within a legislature, which is the focus of the under-representation literature, this work examines the use of ethnicity by these minority legislators to leverage the personal vote. In electoral systems that favor the personal vote, we expect minority legislators to use their ethnicity more often to enhance the personal connection with their constituents, when compared to minority legislators in systems that minimize the incentives to use the personal vote. Similar to other tools legislators use to establish a connection with their voters - delivering pork, emphasizing personal qualities, and pushing local ties - it is expected that legislators will highlight their own ethnic connections when it is likely to pay off electorally.

It is also theoretically viable to expect to find these sorts of appeals using social media as the central measure of this behavior. Measuring the ability of legislators to connect with their voters via the web is not new to political science. Stanyer (2008) looks at the rise of "personalized political culture" in democracies with electoral systems that favor the personal vote. In these systems, individuals take a more central position in party campaigns, making them the 'face' of the party. A key part of this transformation has been the use of web-based mediums to make individuals more visible to mass audiences without relying on the party apparatus (Corner and Pels, 2003). The ease of spreading an individual politician's message has led voters to seek guarantees of authenticity (Street, 2003). The following work anticipates legislators using their personal ethnic connections to enhance their 'authenticity', similar to how local connections or experience may be used.

Stanyer (2008) analyzes the use of official websites by legislators to build this personal connection, with a focus on the presence (or absence) of local birthplace, personal information on their public or private lives, and the emphasis (or lack of) their party affiliation. He finds that US legislators were much more likely than UK legislators to focus on their individual attributes and accomplishments, and tended to deemphasize party affiliations. He theorizes that these differences are due to the stronger incentive to cultivate the personal vote in the US than in the UK. Obholzer and Daniel (2016) use Twitter to analyze the connection between electoral rules and the campaigns of European Parliament Members (MEPs). They find that MEPs make active use of Twitter, but the level is influenced by their home electoral institutions. In line with Carey and Shugart's (1995) predictions, they find that MEPs campaigning in electoral systems relying on preference voting are more active on Twitter, which they use to pursue the personal vote. Stanyer makes an additional relevant point: the efficiency of web-tools will become increasingly important to legislators in fixed number representation electoral systems, where the ratio of representative (or senator) to constituent is steadily rising. For example, in the US, it is projected that this ratio for House representatives will rise from around 400,000 to 1 representative today, to 600,000 to 1 over the next 20 years.

The expectation is that social science research analyzing the use of web-tools, such as social media, should rise as well. The following research takes a tentative step, using only a fraction of the data's true potential.

From this theoretical foundation, the following work endeavors to precisely locate the usage of these appeals across the four cases of study. In doing so, this work is able to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of when and where these appeals are used and the institutional context in which they are employed. The differences across nations should be evidence of the varying institutional arrangements, altering the incentive structures to representatives when seeking elected office.

Methods

The basis for the following analysis is the personal vote classification developed by Carey and Shugart (1995) that ranks electoral systems based on the, "incentive to cultivate the personal vote" within each of these systems. Carey and Shugart rank 13 types of electoral systems from lowest to highest, in terms of the value of the personal vote fostered by the rules within each system. Based on this classification system, it is expected that minority legislators campaigning in states with electoral systems ranked higher on the personal vote incentive index will make more shared identity appeals to their constituents than legislators campaigning in electoral systems that favor the personal vote less. To provide a diverse set of cases, four nations were selected: the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Austria. This work examines legislators who were directly elected, as they are the only politicians with an incentive to appeal to the personal vote. Therefore, this work excludes the appointed and indirectly elected members of the German and Austrian Bundesrats. Using Carey and Shugart's criteria, the expectation is that the single member district and primary selection system in the US provides the highest incentive for the personal vote. In turn, the three European countries provide a low incentive for the personal vote. Across all three, a strong national party system, with an emphasis on party-based political behavior (Moser and Scheiner, 2005), discourages the pursuit of the personal vote when accompanied by the open party-list system, which allows a preferential vote with proportional representation in Austria. Additionally, the SMD plurality system requiring party endorsement of the UK, and the combination of SMD alongside a closed party-list in Germany, should also discourage the use of personal appeals.

To operationalize when a legislator highlights their ethnicity, this work uses social media activity. While certainly not the only avenue a legislator can use to emphasize their ethnic connection to their constituents, social media provides an opportunity to examine a constantly updated platform through which a representative executes their campaign strategy. The expectation is that minority legislators will be more likely to highlight their own ethnicity in electoral systems that favor the personal vote, because it is more likely to provide electoral benefits. By highlighting ethnicity in these systems, these representatives hope to provide cues to potential supporters that share their ethnicity, indicating that they have a unique connection to that voter, and thus understand their specific challenges. As a note, this work focus solely on minority legislators because there is no expectation that legislators from the ethnic majority will rely on ethnic appeals (at least in the Western European context). In these

contexts it is unlikely to deliver electoral benefits and is more likely to trigger backlash and negative publicity.

Originally, this work intended to use both Facebook and Twitter feeds, but ultimately it was determined that using both would be somewhat redundant. Because it is possible to attach one’s Facebook account to their Twitter, allowing both platforms to simultaneously disseminate the same messages, it was concluded that only one of these platforms would be necessary. Facebook was ultimately chosen because it provides the user with fewer parameter restrictions when posting. In theory, both of these platforms should be used by the candidate in nearly identical ways to spread their message during an election.

To determine the identity of the minority representatives, this work primarily used personal biographies provided on official websites. Our primary goal was to obtain a count of posts referencing their minority status by legislator in the 18 months preceding their election. After the minority members were identified, their Facebook posts were retrieved using the program Facepager. A list of key ethnic identifiers across the states was then compiled to use as a basis for the document searches. These consisted of terms such as ‘minority’, ‘ethnic’, and specific minority group (and their German equivalents for the German and Austrian cases). A full list is available in the appendix. Each term was searched systematically across the message text that were posted by the representative. Once a total count was obtained across the search terms, the hits were then totaled. Because the number of posts spans such a wide range,

with US representatives using the platform much more often compared to their British counterparts, an offset was included to insure that the models reflected the rate of posts, rather than the raw count across the cases.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Country	Ethnic Legislators	Total Posts	Posts with Keyword	Max	Min	Average
Germany	18	5388	131	45	0	0.0243
UK	30	9666	53	17	0	0.0055
Austria	3	1363	30	30	0	0.0219
US	83	46,983	1992	133	0	0.0424

The theoretical basis for our model rests on the institutional differences that exist between the US, Britain, Germany and Austria. The exogenous influence of these different electoral systems on the level of ethnic appeals is captured by dummy variables for each state within the fixed effects model. Because there are only four nations, creating a dummy for each case did not compromise the degrees of freedom within these models.

Control Variables

Several control variables should be considered alongside the primary predictor electoral institutions. First, it is possible that incumbency status may alter the use of the personal vote by representatives. Individuals who have already gained elected office and are merely facing reelection may have less of an incentive to use social media to galvanize the personal vote. In order to test this possibility, the models incorporate a dummy variable capturing whether the individual is an incumbent or not. Furthermore, party ideology may make the use of ethnic appeals more or less likely. Based on immigration politics currently playing out in the US and

Europe, it is expected that left-leaning parties will make these appeals more often than their right-leaning opponents. To determine this left/right placement, we use the Comparative Manifesto Project measure for party placements on this dimension. This measure places parties on a range from -100 to 100, moving from left to right. Alongside these two controls, this work also includes the representative's gender. Though there is little literature on the use of ethnic appeals by gender in political science, it might be important to see if appeals differ between men and women.

Results

In order to capture the number of minority appeals, with respect to the wide variety of posts, it was determined that a model capturing the rate of usage was most appropriate model. A negative binomial generalized linear model, offsetting the number of posts for each of the representatives, was able to model the data most effectively. Because the number of minority referenced posts were often zeros, the dependent variable was clearly not normally distributed. To correct for this a negative binomial model was necessary, because the residuals in a traditional Poisson model indicated overdispersion of the data. In order to capture the differences between each nation, fixed effects were used.

As the results illustrate, the overall theoretical expectations that legislators will pursue the personal vote using ethnic appeals to a greater degree in the US, when compared to the European countries, has been demonstrated. In these fixed effects models, the differences in electoral institutions are represented by the dummy variable for each state. The first model, comparing each of the nations independently, using Austria as the reference category, shows that US representatives use these appeals to a greater extent. This finding reaches statistical significance, though the other nations do not. Although there are concerns with the number of observations within the UK, German and Austrian cases, these findings are in the predicted direction and magnitude compared to one another. Additionally, the first model finds that the degree to which these appeals are used is influenced by the left/right placement of the representative, with movement toward the left on this dimension increasing the use of these appeals. Finally, incumbency is very nearly statistically significant at a .95% confidence level with a t-statistic of 1.77. In contrast to the original expectations, this indicates that incumbents likely use these types of appeals more often than new political actors. Though these models conform to our primary theoretical expectations, the second model was also run, explicitly comparing the United States to Great Britain.

Table 2: Proportion of Minority Appeals

	All Countries Estimate (S.E.)	UK vs. US Estimate (S.E.)
(Intercept)	-5.046*** (0.683)	-4.842*** (0.298)
Gender	-0.141 (0.179)	-0.304 (0.175)
Incumbent	0.391 (0.220)	0.312 (0.229)
Left/Right	-0.043*** (0.007)	-0.041*** (0.007)
Germany	0.084 (0.718)	.
UK	0.073 (0.725)	.
US	1.408* (0.687)	.
USvUK	.	1.375*** (0.254)
N	132	111

* $p \leq 0.05$ ** $p \leq 0.01$ *** $p \leq 0.001$

The second model shows that in direct comparison to the UK, the US remains higher in the usage of minority appeals. This relationship is much stronger in this model, reaching a level of statistical significance above the .001 alpha level. Similarly, the influence of left/right placement remains significant, with those on the left end of the spectrum finding themselves more inclined to use minority appeals. Interestingly, the incumbency variable is no longer close to statistical significance, though gender reaches statistical significance at a .10 alpha level. This variable, directionally indicates that men are less likely to use these appeals than women. These results indicate that the predicted institutional differences between these nations exist as hypothesized, but other variables are concerningly unstable across the models. It is clear that a broader base of cases must be obtained in order to precise the true relationships between these nations and the other control variables.

Essentially, these findings indicate that a legislator campaigning in the US will make more ethnic appeals on social media than a legislator campaigning in any of the three European states. Furthermore, there is a clear relationship between where a party falls on the left/right continuum and the use of ethnic appeals. The following section will briefly discuss some of the shortcomings of this work and the opportunities that these findings indicate might be useful areas of further research.

Conclusion

Although, the findings thus far are promising, there are a few issues and opportunities with this work that should be discussed. Certainly one of the greatest weaknesses is the limited nature of these data as collected thus far. Combined, this work only includes 45 minority legislators from Europe with Facebook posts that were accessible, compared to 85 for the United States. The unbalanced nature of our data does make the estimates of the European states more uncertain and volatile. If we had more observations in the European states we may have been able to achieve more precise estimates that would allow a more substantial comparison between states.

For example, using Carey and Shugart's (1995) criteria, one could rank these four states in descending order of personal vote incentive: the US, Germany, Austria, and the UK. The SMD and primary selection system in the US ranks it as providing the highest incentive for the personal vote. The combination of single-member districts with plurality voting for approximately half of the Bundestag's MPs alongside a closed party-list system for the other half likely pushes Germany above the other two European states. The open party-list system that allows a preferential vote with proportional representation in Austria probably puts it at third on the list. The single-member plurality system requiring party endorsement of the UK pushes it to the bottom of the list, with the lowest incentive for the personal vote. If future research was able to gather a larger sample and establish statistically significant coefficients for each state,

we could more meaningfully compare each nation's coefficient.

One of the major limitations to this work has to do with the different types of Facebook pages. For the most part, representatives in the US use public pages to display their official campaign message, but in other nations this trend has yet to fully take hold. Legislators from other states, particularly in Germany, use personal pages. Though it may seem trivial, the difference was problematic during the collection process, as these personal pages were not used for privacy reasons. Unfortunately, this led to a concerning amount of individuals being omitted. The problem was not nearly as severe in the UK (with a loss of about 9), while Germany lost nearly half of its legislators. Although there were some cases lost to individuals obtaining a public Facebook page too late to fall within the selected time frame of interest, this was significantly less than the private/public page loss problem. This problem should fade in the future. As more elections are held in these states, there is no reason to believe that these representatives will not obtain an official Facebook, due to the growing importance of this venue in promoting campaigns.

Moving forward, although there are some important limitations to this work, there is promise in the use of social media as a means of tracking the personal vote. While only analyzing a segment of the personal vote (ethnic appeals), this research has illustrated a significant relationship between electoral institutions and the use of ethnic appeals. Future research should analyze the many other facets of the personal vote that are likely pursued through social media (gender appeals, class appeals, etc.). Furthermore, this research has shown the viability of gathering and utilizing social media as a useful data source. In the future, campaigns will most likely to shift more of their messaging resources onto online platforms, making the incorporation of these sources much more universally viable.

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Appendix

Figure 1:County Comparison in Post Proportions




Figure 2: Country Comparison across Posts and Left/Right Ideology




Table 3: Search Terms

Country	Terms
US	Ethnic
	Black
	African American
	Hispanic/Latino
	Cuban
	Mexican
	Puerto Rican
	Asian-Pacific
	Japanese
	Chinese
	Thai
	Portuguese
	Native American
	Chickasaw
	Lebanese

UK	Immigrant/Immigration Ethnic Turkey/Turkish/British Turkish Jamaica/Jamaican/British Jamaican Pakistan/Pakistani/ British Pakistani India/Indian/British Indian Sierra Leone/Sierra Leonean/British/Sierra Leonean Kenya/Kenyan/British Kenyan Ghana/Ghanaian/British Ghanaian Bangladesh/Bangladeshi/British Bangladeshi Iran/Iranian/British Iranian Guyana/Guyanese/British Guyanese Grenada/Grenadian/British Grenadian China/Chinese/British Chinese Nigeria/Nigerian/British Nigerian Iraq/Iraqi/British Iraqi
Germany	Eiwanderer(in)/Einwanderung Immigrant(in)/Immigration Türkei/Türkisch Polen/Polieren Belgien/Belgisch Senegal/Senegalisch Kroatien/Kroatisch Iran/Iranisch Armenien/Armenisch Tschechien/Tschechisch Engländer/Grossbritannien/Britisch
Austria	Einwanderin/Einwanderung Immigrantin/Immigration Türkei Türkisch

Table 4: Variable Coding

Variable	Code
Gender	0: Female; 1:Male
Incumbent	0:Non-Incumbent; 1:Incumbent
Left/Right	Ideology Measure: -100 to 100; -100, Liberal and 100, Conservative